YEMEN
Capital:
Sanaa
Population:
19,349,881
GDP:
$15.07 billion
GNI per capita:
$490
Scores:
Civil Liberties:3.63
Rule of Law:3.45
Anticorruption and Transparency:1.85
Accountability and Public Voice:3.23
(scores are based on a scale of 0 to 7,with 0 representing
weakest and 7 representing strongest performance)
by Brian Katulis
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since the unification of North and South in 1990,Yemen has taken steps
toward establishing a more democratic system of government in a com-
plex and challenging environment.In the face of widespread poverty and
illiteracy,tribal in fluences that limit the central government’s authority in
certain parts of the country,a heavily armed citizenry,continuing internal
tensions and challenges to the state’s unity exempli fied by the 1994 civil
war,and the threat of radical Islamist terrorism,Yemen has succeeded in
expanding democratic freedoms and increasing respect for human rights,
becoming an example for the rest of the Arabian Peninsula.
In combining the different political and legal systems of two formerly
independent countries,Yemen has developed a signi ficant,though still in-
complete,body of legislation guaranteeing many internationally accepted
political rights and civil liberties.Although Yemen’s record on human rights
and the rule of law remains imperfect,it has developed legal safeguards
2 Yemen
and new institutions intended to prevent human rights abuses,torture,and
arbitrary detention.Yemeni citizens enjoy a degree of freedom of expres-
sion and speech not present in many other Arab countries,although the
government continues to control and censor key aspects of the media.Ye-
men is one of the few countries in the Arab world to organize regular elec-
tions at the national and local levels,with competition among the ruling
General People’s Congress (GPC)party;the two main opposition parties,
the Islamist Yemeni Assembly for Reform (or Islah Party)and the Yemeni
Socialist Party (YSP);and a handful of other parties.
Yemen is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights,the International Covenant on Economic,Social,and Cultural
Rights,the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity and the International Convention for the Sup-
pression of the Traf fic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution
of Others,among other international human rights and democracy conven-
tions and treaties.Article 6 of Yemen’s constitution con firms its adherence
to the United Nations Charter,the International Declaration of Human
Rights,and the general principles of international law.In 2003,Yemen
established the first ministry of human rights in the Arab world.
Despite these positive signs and efforts,Yemen has a long road of reform
ahead.In some areas where legal safeguards are present,such as protec-
tions against human rights abuses,the government’s implementation and
execution of the law is uneven because of lack of funding,poor training,and
corruption.In other areas,particularly transparency,accountability,anticor-
ruption,and the independence of the judiciary,Yemen has much work to do
to improve both the legal framework and government implementation.
The judiciary is nominally independent but in practice is weak and sus-
ceptible to interference from the executive branch.Government authorities
have a spotty record of enforcing judicial rulings,particularly those issued
against prominent tribal or political leaders.The lack of a truly independent
judiciary impedes progress in all areas of democracy and good governance;
without an independent arbiter for disputes,people often resort to tribal
forms of justice or direct appeals to the executive branch of government.
Corruption is an endemic problem at all levels of Yemeni government and
society.Despite recent efforts by the government to fight corruption and
institute a civil service reform program,Yemen lacks most legal safeguards
against con flicts of interest.In addition,the chief auditing and investigation
bodies charged with fighting corruption are not suf ficiently independent
from the executive authorities.
Although Yemen’s government faces a daunting environment with nu-
merous challenges —terrorism,poverty,and lack of public awareness —there
Yemen 3
is much that it can do to build on the modest successes it has achieved in
creating a more democratic society.The overriding problem in Yemen’s
system of government is its over-reliance on the executive branch.President
Ali Abdullah Saleh and his political party,the GPC,enjoy a monopoly on
virtually all forms of meaningful political power.Yemen’s government suf-
fers from the absence of any real system of checks and balances and limits
on the executive’s authority.Rather than opening the door for increased
political pluralism,Yemen’s parliamentar y election of April 2003 was a
missed opportunity,marred by cheating and by reports of intimidation,
misuse of state resources,and control of certain media outlets by the ruling
party.Political rights in Yemen,therefore,are weakened by the fact that
the ruling GPC uses its signi ficant advantages of incumbency,administra-
tive resources,and media in fluence to preserve its dominance and restrict
political competition.
CIVIL LIBERTIES – 3.63
Yemen’s constitution offers protections against arbitrary arrest and deten-
tion without trial,but it is ambiguous regarding the prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment.1 Yemen’s government has stepped up efforts to
reduce the incidence of torture,but violations continue,in part due to a lack
of adequate training and awareness among law enforcement of ficials.
Prosecution of state of ficers accused of torturing and abusing prisoners is
uneven.All public employees are immune from prosecution for crimes al-
legedly committed while on duty.The attorney general must provide special
permission to prosecutors to investigate allegations against members of the
security forces,and the head of the appeals court must lift the immunity
before the accused is tried.2
By law,detainees must be arraigned within 24 hours of arrest or be re-
leased.However,arbitrar y detention occurs,sometimes because law-en-
forcement of ficials lack proper training and at other times because political
will is absent at the most senior levels of government.One prominent
example of the latter from 2003 was the arrest inside the presidential build-
ing and detention without charge of members of the Jahm tribe.The Jahm
tribal leaders reportedly had a dispute with of ficials while in the presidential
of fice,and they were detained,initially in a military prison.These leaders
were ultimately released after mediation by another tribal leader,not be-
cause of any procedure related to the courts or the rule of law.3
The global war on terror has created pressures on Yemen to exploit all
means available to counteract the threat posed by suspected terrorists.After
the attacks on the United States on September 11,2001,and amid evidence
of signi ficant al-Qaeda links in the country,Yemen’s internal security forces
4 Yemen
conducted a series of mass arrests,incommunicado detentions,and depor-
tations of foreigners,using methods that sometimes violated international
human rights conventions and basic rule-of-law standards.In the summer
of 2003,international human rights groups and Yemeni government of-
ficials estimated that approximately 200 individuals continue to be detained
inde finitely without trial or access to lawyers or judicial authorities to chal-
lenge the legality of their detention.4 The minister of interior of Yemen,
in an address to parliament on July 16,2003,said that 95 people accused
of belonging to al-Qaeda were released because they “had changed their
ideas”and that 195 others remained in detention because they “persist in
holding on to the ideas they believe in.”5 Some of these releases were part
of an Islamically oriented approach rehabilitation,begun when President
Saleh asked Judge Hamood Al-Hitar to form a “Dialogue Committee”to
persuade fundamentalist Islamist Yemenis to renounce violence and their
fanatical views.6
On December 28,2002,Jarallah Omar,the deputy director of the Yemeni
Socialist Party (YSP)was assassinated shortly after concluding a speech at
a party conference of Islah.Omar had been a key figure in efforts to com-
bine the campaigns of the two main opposition parties leading up to the
2003 elections.Although government authorities arrested and prosecuted
a radical Islamist and member of Islah for the murder,of ficials in the YSP
continued to demand a more thorough investigation,maintaining that too
many questions about the murderer and his previous ties to government
security agencies remained unanswered.7
The constitution provides for freedom of assembly,but the government
has taken steps to limit this freedom in practice.The state has generally
refrained from excessive force in dealing with demonstrations and public
protests and usually opts for more sophisticated measures,like placing per-
sonnel from security forces within demonstrations as a means to control
them.In the spring of 2003 one prominent protest against the war in Iraq
in front of the U.S.embassy in Sanaa resulted in the deaths of several Ye-
meni citizens and security forces.
By law,women are afforded protections against discrimination and pro-
vided with guarantees of equality under the Sharia (Islamic law).In prac-
tice,however,women continue to face pervasive discrimination in several
aspects of life.For example,the Labor Law of 1995 provides safeguards for
preventing discrimination against women in the workplace,but in practice
discrimination is common and women remain vastly under-represented in
the workforce.Women constitute only one-fifth of the workforce,and their
participation in government jobs is much lower.Yemen’s Education Act en-
sures equality of access to education,but Yemen has one of the largest gaps
Yemen 5
in the world between boys’and girls’net primary school attendance rates.
The law provides for protection of women against violence,but in practice
such provisions are rarely enforced.The penal code allows for leniency for
persons guilty of violent assault or killing of women for alleged immodest
behavior or “crimes of honor.”8
Women who seek to go abroad must obtain permission from their hus-
bands or fathers to receive a passport and travel.Women —unlike men —do
not have the right to confer citizenship on their foreign-born spouses,and
the process for conferring citizenship on children born in the country of
foreign-born fathers is in practice more dif ficult than for children born of
Yemeni fathers and foreign-born mothers.9 Civil-society organizations and
human rights monitors report that female prisoners are not released at the
end of their sentences unless a male relative is present.10
Yemen is relatively homogeneous ethnically and racially.The Akhdam
(Arabic for servants),a small minority group that lives in poverty and faces
social discrimination.11
Article 2 of the constitution states that Islam is the religion of the state,and
Article 3 declares that Islamic Sharia is the source of all legislation.Although
the constitution guarantees the freedom of religion,based on Islamic Sharia,a
Muslim converting to another religion is guilty of the crime of apostasy,which
is de jure punishable by death.Nevertheless,there have been no reported in-
stances of the government prosecuting citizens for this crime.
Overall,the state refrains from excessive interference in the appointment
of religious and spiritual leaders,although it has taken some steps to pre-
vent politicization of mosques and Islamic religious schools for extremist
purposes.12 Although it offers no special protections to nonbelievers,it
also does not institute policies to discriminate against them and generally
respects their rights.
Yemenis have the right to form associations in “scienti fic,cultural,social,
and national unions in a way that serves the goals of the Constitution,”ac-
cording to Article 58 of that document.13 Although it is a small country,Ye-
men has several thousand nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),accord-
ing to estimates from the government.However,several observers question
how independent many of these NGOs are from the ruling party.
The government respects the right to form and join trade unions,and
the General Federation of Trade Unions of Yemen —the main union or-
ganization,with an estimated 350,000 members in 14 unions —dominates
the landscape.14 Critics claim that several syndicates are ineffective in pro-
tecting the interests of their members and that the government and ruling
party elements have recently stepped up efforts to control the affairs of
these organizations.15
6 Yemen
Recommendations
The Yemeni government should implement a comprehensive program
to train law-enforcement,security,and prison of ficials in the proper pro-
cedures for arresting,detaining,and interrogating accused individuals.The
government should also lift the immunity of public of ficials for crimes
committed while on duty.National laws,particularly personal status laws
on obtaining citizenship,need to be amended to ensure that women enjoy
full equality under the law.
The clause in the penal code that allows for leniency for persons guilty
of so-called crimes of honor must be eliminated.The state should institute
and implement a national legal requirement making school attendance
mandatory for all students,both male and female,until the age of 15.
RULE OF LAW – 3.45
Despite efforts in recent years by the Yemeni government to reform the
judiciar y and enhance its capacity,the court system remains the weak-
est link of the three branches of government,susceptible to interference
from the executive branch and unable to implement its rulings in many
parts of the country.
In theor y,Yemen’s judiciar y is independent.Article 149 of Yemen’s
constitution states that “the judicial authority is an autonomous authority
in its judicial,financial,and administrative aspects,and the General Pros-
ecution is one of its sub-bodies.The courts shall judge all disputes and
crimes.Judges are independent and not subject to any authority,except
the law.”In practice,however,Yemen’s Judicial Authority Law,which
provides further de finition of how the judiciary is managed,includes pro-
visions that some legal analysts and civil-society leaders argue contradict
the constitutional safeguards of the judiciary’s independence.Article 104
of this law assigns the president of the republic to the supreme judicial
council (SJC),which manages the affairs of the judiciary.In addition to
the president,the minister of justice,the deputy minister of justice,and
the head of the judicial inspection board,who reports to the minister of
justice,all serve on the SJC.These provisions legally enable the executive
to maintain a strong degree of control over the judicial branch.
More speci fically,under the judicial authority law,the ministry of justice
has a number of powers that constrain the judiciary’s independence —su-
pervising the finances,administration,and organization of the courts;reas-
signing judges and authorizing them to take non-judicial jobs;selecting the
number of members in the Supreme Court and courts of appeal;and de fin-
ing the location and selecting the jurisdiction limits of primary courts.16
Yemen 7
One prominent example cited by current and former members of par-
liament of the judiciary not playing a role as independent arbiter of legal
matters is its refusal to offer a judgment in a case regarding a disputed
election for the leadership of the house of representatives.Five members
of parliament,representing the ruling GPC and two main opposition
parties,the YSP and Islah,took a case to court arguing that the execu-
tive branch had interfered with the leadership elections and asking for
a re-vote in mid-2003.The Supreme Court justice in this case,Zeid
bin Zeid Al-Jumra,initially took the case but then refused to issue a
ruling.17
In addition to this most basic issue of limits on judicial independence,
the judiciary suffers from a lack of adequate resources,which hinders its
ability to hire and train quali fied judges and implement its rulings.In
rural areas,Yemenis frequently rely on traditional tribal forms of justice.
A judicial reform move increased the salaries of judges as a measure to
eliminate corruption,but this has not proven to be a panacea for the
problem of judges taking bribes.According to Ismail Al-Wazir,the for-
mer justice minister who started the judicial reform process,“even the
corrupt will not be satis fied by millions.”18
Yemen’s law provides citizens with the opportunity for a fair and pub-
lic trial and guarantees of access to independent counsel.Article 47 of
the constitution states that the accused is innocent until proven guilty by
final judicial ruling,and no law may be enacted to put a person on trial
retroactively for acts committed.Article 48 of the constitution prohibits
arrests made without warrant issued by a judge or prosecutor.
The ministr y of the interior oversees the criminal investigative de-
partment of the police,which conducts most criminal investigations
and arrests.The ministr y of interior also maintains oversight of prison
conditions for the 10,348 inmates detained in Yemen as of September
2003.19 Unlike many other countries in the Arab world,Yemen does not
have state security courts.However,the political security of fice (PSO),
Yemen’s primary internal security force,operates under the control of the
president,with little or no oversight from other parts of the executive
branch,the parliament,or judicial authorities.
Yemen’s constitution and overall legal framework afford all citizens
equal treatment under the law.In practice,the legal system remains
highl y informal,with personal connections and networks frequentl y
trumping the dictates of the law.The government ’s record on respecting
and enforcing property rights is weak,particularly in parts of the coun-
try where tribal forces are strong and government authority is limited.
8 Yemen
Recommendations
The Yemeni government should take steps to decrease the potential for the
executive branch’s interference in the judiciary,such as removing the president
from the supreme judicial council.It should also create tighter linkages and
better coordination mechanisms between the judicial authorities and the po-
lice to ensure that judicial rulings are fully implemented and respected.
All police and security authorities should be subject to oversight and in-
vestigation from the legislative branch of government and the judiciary,in
addition to the executive branch.Suspects allegedly involved with terrorist
organizations should be charged with a crime and tried or,if insuf ficient
evidence exists,released.In addition,the government should seek to con-
tinue to rehabilitate extremists using religious or traditional means,as with
the efforts of Judge Hamood Al-Hitar.
ANTICORRUPTION AND TRANSPARENCY – 1.85
Corruption is a major problem in Yemen,a fact recognized not only by
the political opposition but also by senior members of the current govern-
ment,including the head of Yemen’s primar y audit agency and numer-
ous ministers.Yemen ranked 88th out of 133 countries on Transparency
International’s 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index.Fighting corruption is
a main feature of the current government’s agenda.
Yemen’s civil service and public administration suffer from overall underde-
veloped institutional capacity,inef ficient management systems,burdensome
procedures,underpaid civil servants who sometimes resort to corruption to
supplement their incomes,and an unnecessarily large number of personnel.
Hamoud Khalid Al-Su fi,the minister of civil service and procurement,stated
publicly in October 2003 that the Yemeni government did not have an accu-
rate count of Yemen’s civil servants,but that such a count should be completed
in 2004.Al-Su fi estimates job redundancies at 30,000,but a final determina-
tion will be made after Yemen’s current review.20 Yemen has embarked on a
reform process to eradicate bureaucratic inef ficiencies and corruption in the
civil service,but the efforts have been impeded in part by low salaries and
widespread poverty throughout the country.The government ’s patronage
system involves “employing”thousands of Yemenis in government positions,
with many collecting salaries for which they perform no duties.
Privatization has been one of the slowest components of the economic re-
form program,in part because of lack of proper laws and rules governing the
privatization process.21 In September 2003,40 information technology and
computer companies operating in Yemen sent a letter to President Saleh op-
posing a decision by the Yemeni government to offer the Al-Basair company
Yemen 9
a monopoly on all information technology-related services,machinery,and
training for 25 years.22 The publication of this letter demonstrates that a de-
gree of political space exists to question government decisions,but at the same
time offers signs that the government is slow to privatize and open Yemen’s
economy to more competition.
Articles 118 and 136 of the constitution prohibit the president and min-
isters from engaging in private business of any kind.However,because
Yemen currently does not require income or financial assets disclosure by
government of ficials,enforcement relies on an honor system dependent on
truthful self-reporting and self-monitoring.
The central organization for control and auditing (COCA)ser ves as
the supreme audit institution in the country.COCA conducts a series of
regular audits of government ministries and organizations.Even though
COCA of ficials claim that it is fully independent from the executive branch
of government,current COCA chairman Abdullah Abdullah Al-Sanafani
acknowledged in September 2003 that it conducts special audits requested
by “higher authorities,”the catch phrase often used to describe the of fice
of President Saleh.23
When suf ficient evidence is gathered pointing to prosecutable cases of
corruption,COCA refers them to the public funds prosecution of fice,as
well as President Saleh’s of fice.24 COCA’s chairman estimates that in the
six months before September 2003,45 cases had been presented to the
public funds prosecutor.25
Although Yemen’s laws require a degree of transparency and public ac-
cess to information,in practice detailed accounting of expenditures rarely
occurs in a timely fashion.The state offers few procedures to ensure trans-
parency,open bidding,and effective competition in awarding government
contracts.
Recommendations
Yemen’s government should introduce requirements of public disclosure
of personal finances,including income,assets,and all business interests,
from all senior public of ficials such as the president,senior staff to the presi-
dent,government ministers,top ministry of ficials,judges and other senior
judicial authorities,and members of parliament.The state should establish
formal mechanisms,such as an anonymous telephone tip line,by which
government employees and individuals can report instances of alleged cor-
ruption and misuse of public resources.A body that is fully independent of
the president and the executive branch should be established to investigate
and prosecute alleged instances of corruption,and reports of investigations
should be made publicly available.
10 Yemen
ACCOUNTABILITY AND PUBLIC VOICE – 3.23
Yemen is a republic headed by a popularly elected president,with a bi-
cameral parliament composed of a 301-seat popularly elected house of rep-
resentatives and a 111-member Shura council appointed by the president.
The house of representatives has legislative authority,and the Shura council
serves in an advisory capacity.
On the surface,Yemen appears to have a relatively open democratic sys-
tem.Regular elections have been a key feature of Yemen’s political land-
scape since 1990.With 22 political parties,Yemenis seemingly are free to
support a range of political positions.Yet in reality,Yemen’s politics are
monopolized by the ruling party,the GPC.In 2003 the GPC increased
the number of parliament seats it holds from 145 to 240.26 In 1999,Presi-
dent Saleh was elected to a five-year term in the country’s first nationwide
direct presidential election,winning 96.3 percent of the vote.Saleh’s only
opponent came from within his ruling GPC party,and his term in of fice
was extended from five to seven years in a 2001 referendum.27
The April 2003 parliamentary elections took place despite concerns that
popular unrest resulting from the war in Iraq might lead to a postponement.
International election obser vers noted that Yemen has made substantial
improvements in electoral management and administration,using tech-
nology to develop an advanced voter registr y system.28 In addition,one
of the chief achievements of the 2003 parliamentar y elections was the
relative peacefulness —compared to previous elections,there were fewer
incidents of violence.On the surface,the elections were competitive.The
opposition Islah party won seats in former GPC strongholds,including
parts of the capital city of Sanaa such as President Saleh’s home district.
However,numerous problems surfaced.Voter registration was character-
ized by widespread fraud and cheating.The International Foundation for
Election Systems (IFES)estimates that the number of underage voters was
in the hundreds of thousands,with the number of voters aged 18 and 19
exceeding the actual number of Yemenis in that age bracket.Yemen’s chief
election administration body,the supreme commission for elections and
referenda (SCER),noted that the number of underage voters was at least
150,000,but even though underage voting violates Article 64 of Yemen’s
constitution,the commission did nothing to rectify the problem.29
During the campaign,the election administration placed limits on the
issues and presentations made by candidates in televised campaign state-
ments.A single member of the SCER was the final decision maker on what
candidates could and could not say during televised appearances,offering
no opportunity to appeal this decision.30
Yemen 11
International and domestic election monitors and Yemeni unions noted
that the ruling GPC party used state resources to in fluence the outcome of
the vote.For example,the ministry of education allowed the use of schools
for campaign activities.31 In certain parts of the country,government of-
ficials threatened teachers with transfer or the loss of their jobs if they did
not help the GPC in its campaign.32 In addition,international election
monitors noted that elements of the ruling GPC employed “heavy-handed
and coercive measures”on election day.33 Although provision exists in the
law for public financing for campaigns,parties are also permitted to raise
unregulated funds from private donors,a system that numerous analysts
believe favors the ruling party.
Article 62 of the constitution and Sections 24 and 53 of the Election
Law require that the populations of all constituencies be equal in size,with
a variation of not more than plus or minus 5 percent.34 Nevertheless,as
drawn,the boundaries of electoral constituencies do de fine populations
of unequal size.In addition,according to independent domestic election
monitors,the judiciary did not thoroughly and carefully review election
disputes;it responded to 56 separate complaints in the post-election period,
taking only three days to issue its ruling,35 which prompted complaints that
the merits of different election disputes were not carefully considered.
Yemen held local government elections in 2001.Although local council
members are popularly elected,the 2000 Law on Local Authority allows
for the appointment of the chairpersons of local councils by the president.
In practice,the chairpersons hold the preponderance of power in the local
councils,and the Local Authority Law does not grant substantial decision-
making authority to the council members.36
In the 1990s,Yemen embarked on a comprehensive campaign to enhance
women’s political participation by placing a strong emphasis on registering
women to vote.The number of women registered increased nearly seven-
fold,from half a million in the 1993 parliamentary elections to over three
million in the 2003 parliamentary elections.37 However,women are vastly
under-represented in most senior leadership positions in government of fic-
es.Yemen’s government has attempted to increase women’s participation by
instituting an informal quota system in government ministries,but women’s
rights activists in Yemen note that these of ficials are often marginalized
because of societal biases against women in the workplace.
The under-representation of women is starkest in Yemen’s elected of fices.
Despite the best efforts of women’s rights groups to increase the number of
women in parliament,only one woman won a seat in the 2003 parliamen-
tary elections,out of a total of 301 seats.38 Few women ran as candidates for
the top political parties.Out of a total of 1,400 candidates in the election,
12 Yemen
only 11 were female.39 At the local government level,women won only 38
seats out of 6,676 in the 2001 elections.40 There are no female judges serv-
ing in the northern part of the country and the only four in the south are
not currently acting judges.41
Except for certain positions in Yemen’s foreign ministry,no merit-based
competitive selection process exists for civil-service positions.Minister of
Civil Service and Procurement Khalid Al-Su fi decided in September 2003
to suspend all employment procedures because of corruption and bribes
taken by people in charge of the hiring process.
The constitution provides guarantees to protect the rights of an indepen-
dent civic sector,and for the most part the government allows civic organi-
zations to conduct their work freely.Overall,donors to civic organizations
and public policy institutes are free of pressures from the state.However,
the government and parliament do not have well-developed procedures for
the regular,organized,and meaningful involvement of outside groups in
the formulation of laws and policy.
Security forces and other government bodies reportedly continue to
threaten and harass journalists,42 although the number of arrests of jour-
nalists seems to have diminished in the past year.In addition,because
of the relative weakness of the state in certain regions of the countr y,
Yemen’s government offers few protections to journalists from powerful
tribal forces.
Article 103 of the Press and Publications Law outlaws “direct personal
criticism of the head of state”and publication of material that “might
spread a spirit of dissent and division among the people”or “leads to
the spread of ideas contrary to the principles of the Yemeni Revolution,
prejudicial to national unity or distorting the image of the Yemeni,Arab,
or Islamic heritage.”Critics maintain that these vague provisions,com-
bined with the lack of a strong judiciary,create an environment in which
the government can use the threat of legal sanction against journalists
who are critical of government policies.
The print media do not seem to have a strong impact across much of
Yemeni society,which has a rate of illiteracy estimated at 54 percent.43 The
state maintains a monopoly over the media that matter most —television
and radio.In these media,direct criticism of government policies is rare,
and investigative journalism is virtually non-existent.
Minister of Information Hussein Al-Awadi acknowledges the lack of
pluralism in the broadcast media.He says that the government hopes to
introduce legislation in the coming year that would set procedures enabling
people to start private radio and television stations.Al-Awadi also notes
that allowing opposition forces and others to set up their own television or
Yemen 13
radio stations would be tantamount to “giving them the power,”acknowl-
edging that television and radio have stronger potential to in fluence and
shape views than the print media.44
Recommendations
The Yemeni government should enhance the training,direction,and
oversight of local election of ficials to ensure that they can ful fill their re-
sponsibilities.For the long term,the Yemeni government should invest
in measures to de-politicize the electoral administration,such as creating
an election administration staffed with properly trained civil ser vants.It
should also redraw the boundaries of the electoral constituencies in accor-
dance with the principles set by the constitution and the Election Law.The
state should establish special mechanisms to expedite the dispute-resolu-
tion and appeals process at all stages of the election cycle,either by further
developing the capacity of the SCER to rule or setting up special and in-
dependent electoral courts to arbitrate disputes in a timely,thorough,and
cost-effective manner.
The legislature should amend the Law for Press and Publications to ei-
ther clarify or delete the numerous vaguely worded provisions on outlawed
publications in Articles 137 to 153.
The government should develop procedures and regulations to permit the
establishment of private and independent broadcast media outlets in order
to reduce the state’s monopoly over radio and television.
Brian Katulis is a research consultant who has worked on Freedom House’s
projects in the Middle East,including a series of focus groups for Freedom House’s
Survey of Women’s Freedom in the Middle East and North Africa.
Notes
1
Yemen ,Countr y Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2002 (Washington,D.C.:U.S.
Department of State,Bureau of Democracy,Human Rights,and Labor,31 March 2003),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18293.htm.
2 Ibid.
3 Yemen Times,“Jahm Sheikhs Released,”Yemen Times Staff,18 –21 September 2003,http://
yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=669&p=local&a=1.
4 Interviews with Yemen government of ficials,Sanaa,23 –30 September,2003.
5 “Yemen:The Rule of Law Sidelined in the Name of Security”(London:Amnesty Inter-
national,24 September 2003).
6 For more background on the Dialogue Committee,see “Youth of the Holy War,”Inter-
view of the Week in Yemen Times,27 January 27 –3 February 2004,http://www.yementimes.
com/03/iss4/intrview.htm.
7 Interview with Abdulgani Abdulqader,Ali Al-Sarari,and Mohammed Al-Mekla fi,YSP
14 Yemen
of ficials,Sanaa,28 September 2003.
8 Inter view with Rashida Al-Hamdani,Chairperson of the Women’s National Commit-
tee,and Ramzia Al-Eryani,Yemeni Women’s Union,Sanaa,28 September 2003;“Yemen
Country Pro file”(New York:United Nations Development Program,2003);Country Re-
ports (U.S.Dept.of State).
9 Country Reports (U.S.Dept.of State).
10 Jamal Al-Admimi,Human Rights,48 (Sanaa:Forum for Civil Society [FCS],December
2002).
11 Country Reports (U.S.Dept.of State).
12 Ibid.
13 The Constitution of the Republic of Yemen (Athawabit Journal,A Quarterly Journal of
Culture,Development,and Politics,April 2002).
14 Country Reports (U.S.Dept.of State).
15 Interviews with members of the journalists’and teachers’syndicates,25 and 29 September
2003.
16 Jamal Al-Adimi and Faisal Assw fi,“Justice Report:Yemen 2000,”Al-Qistas 7 (FCS ,
2000).
17 Interviews with Muhammad Al-Shadadi,current GPC member of parliament,and Saa-
daldeen Ali Talib,former GPC member of parliament,Sanaa,24 September 2003;interview
with Sakher Al-Wajei,current GPC member of parliament,Sanaa,27 September 2003.
18 Interview with Ismail Al-Wazir,Sanaa,28 September 2003.
19 Inter view with Rashid Jarhoom,Yemen’s Deputy Minister of Interior,Sanaa,29 Sep-
tember 2003.
20 Mohammed Al-Qadhi,“We Do Not Know Exactly the Number of Yemen’s Civil Ser-
vants,”Yemen Times ,9 October 2003.
21 “Review of the Annual Strategic Report:Yemen 2002 –2003”(Sanaa:General Center for
Studies,Research,and Publishing,2003);Saif Al-Asaly,“Privatisation in Yemen”(Sanaa:
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung [FES],October 2002).
22 Yemen Times staff,“40 Companies Oppose Monopoly of Yemen’s IT Sector,”Yemen
Times,vol.13,no.671,25 September 2003.
23 Interview with Abdullah Abdullah Al-Sanafani,Sanaa,27 September 2003.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.;April 27,2003 Parliamentary Elections in Yemen:Final Report,National Democratic
Institute for International Affairs.The GPC won 230 seats in the election,and 10 candidates
who won seats later joined the GPC,increasing the party’s number of seats to 240.
26 Electionworld.org;Election Guide,International Foundation for Election System,http://
www.ifes.org.
27 Country Reports (U.S.Dept.of State).
28 Interview with representatives from the National Democratic Institute for International
Affairs (NDI)and the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES),Sanaa,27
September 2003.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Interview with Ahmed Al-Su fiand Abdullah Sallam Al-Hakimi of the Yemen Institute
for Development of Democracy,Sanaa,25 September 2003.
33 “Preliminary Statement on the NDI International Election Observer Delegation to Ye-
Yemen 15
men’s April 27 Legislative Elections”(Washington,D.C.:National Democratic Institute
for International Affairs,29 April 2003).
34 Ibid.
35 Inter view with Abdul Majed Al-Fahed,Executive Director of the Civic Democratic
Initiative Support Foundation (CDF),Sanaa,26 September 2003.
36 “Yemen’s Constitutional Referendum and Local Elections”(New York:Human Rights
Watch [HRW],February 2001).
37 Interview with Amat Al-Aleem Al-Soswa,Yemen’s Minister of Human Rights,Wash-
ington,D.C.,10 September 2003.
38 Interviews with Orass Sultan Naji,GPC member of parliament,the only woman elected
to serve in Yemen’s current parliament,Sanaa,24 and 26 September 2003.
39 “Review of the Annual Strategic Report:Yemen 2002 –2003”(Sanaa:General Center for
Studies,Research,and Publishing,2003).
40 Mujahed Al-Mussa’abi,“National Committee for Women:Challenges &Future,”Yemen
Times ,18 –24 November 2002.
41 Interview with Rashida Al-Hamdani,Chairperson of the Women’s National Committee,
Sanaa,28 September 2003.
42 Inter view with members of the journalists’syndicate,25 September 2003;inter view
with Abdul Rahim Mohsen,opposition journalist imprisoned in 2002 for “undermining
national harmony,”who alleges continued intimidation by government authorities,Sanaa,
29 September 2003.
43 “Review of the Annual Strategic Report:Yemen 2002 –2003”(Sanaa:General Center for
Studies,Research,and Publishing,2003).
44 Interview with Hussein Al-Awadi,Yemen’s minister of information,Sanaa,24 September
2003.
